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Risk Rationing and Activity Choice in
Moral Hazard Constrained Credit Markets
Abstract
This paper explores the productivity and income distribution eﬀects of asymmetric information and risk
preferences on the credit market. A model of contract design in the presence of moral hazard is developed
in which competitive, risk neutral lenders oﬀer contracts to risk averse agents who hold the option to invest
capital and labor time in an entrepreneurial activity. The model gives rise to the potential for quantity
rationing and an additional form of non-price rationing called risk rationing.B o t h q u a n t i t y a n d r i s k
rationed agents would seek credit and carry out the entrepreneurial activity in a ￿rst best, or symmetric
information world. When information is asymmetric, the menu of available loan contracts shrinks. In
equilibrium, neither type of agent ends up with a loan contract, and both undertake a safe, but low return
wage labor activity. Quantity rationed agents are involuntarily excluded from the entrepreneurial activity
because they are denied any loan contract. Risk rationed agents voluntarily retreat from the credit market
and the entrepreneurial activity rather than choose among the limited set of high risk contracts available
to them in the presence of asymmetric information. Analysis shows that both quantity and risk rationing
are likely to be wealth-biased, inhibiting the activity choice and the income earning potential of low wealth
agents, and reproducing initial inequality.
JEL Classi￿cation: D81, D82, O12.
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USA1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In a competitive world of symmetric information and costless enforcement, credit contracts could
be written conditional on borrower behavior. Borrowers would then have access to loans under
any interest rate-collateral combination that would yield lenders a zero expected pro￿t. However,
as a large literature has shown, information asymmetries and enforcement costs that make such
conditional contracting infeasible will restrict the set of available contracts, eliminating as incentive
incompatible high interest rate, low collateral contracts.1 As has been emphasized in the literature,
this contraction of contract space can result in quantity rationing in which potential borrowers
who lack the wealth to fully collateralize loans are involuntarily excluded from the credit market
and thus prevented from undertaking high return investments.
The principal contribution of this paper is to show that the contraction of contract space in-
duced by asymmetric information can result in another form of non-price rationing, one that we
label ￿risk rationing.￿ Risk rationing occurs when lenders, constrained by asymmetric informa-
tion, shift so much contractual risk to the borrower that the borrower voluntarily withdraws from
the credit market even when she or he has the necessary collateral wealth to qualify for a loan
contract.2 The private and social costs of risk rationing are similar to those of more conventional
quantity rationing. Like quantity-rationed individuals, risk rationed individuals will retreat to
lower expected return activities. Moreover, under mild assumptions about the nature of risk
aversion, risk rationing will, like quantity rationing, be wealth-biased and predominately aﬀect
lower wealth individuals and ￿rms. As in Eswaran and Kotwal￿s (1990) analysis, initial wealth
and activity choice become tightly linked by ￿nancial market imperfections.3
1 Summaries of this literature include: (Hillier and Ibrahimo, 1993), (Jaﬀee and Stiglitz, 1990), (Dowd, 1992)
and (Besley, 1995).
2 Like an interest rate increase, an increase in contractual risk will also help equilibrate the loan market by
reducing demand and is thus a form of non-price rationing.
3 Eswaran and Kotwal assume that quantity rationing exists, whereas the analysis here shows that both quantity
and risk rationing are the endogenous result of optimal, competitive loan contracts under asymmetric information
and risk aversion. While their work shows that initial wealth diﬀerences, not Knightian diﬀerences in risk-bearing
capacity, explain who becomes the entreprenuers, the analysis here reveals a subtle interplay between wealth,
changing risk aversion, optimal contract design and the functioning of the credit market.
1The distinction between quantity and risk rationing highlights the fact that a ￿rm￿s activity
choice depends both on the ￿nancial feasibility of activities and preference ranking over available
activities. The credit rationing literature has focussed primarily on the former. The latter is
important, however, because the fact that a positive loan oﬀer makes a high return project ￿nan-
cially feasible, does not imply that the project will be chosen over other (safer) activities. When
insurance markets are missing, the choice over alternative activities will depend on the nature of
risk preferences and on the degree to which credit contracts oﬀer partial insurance through the
provision of limited liability. The analysis here will show that the degree to which the credit mar-
ket ful￿lls the dual roles of providing liquidity and insurance￿and for whom￿will depend critically
upon the nature of the information environment and producers￿ risk preferences.
In addition to ￿lling a theoretical lacuna, the distinction between quantity and risk rationing
is important from the perspective of empirical work. The econometrics of credit rationing have
struggled with the fundamental problem of distinguishing individuals with zero loan demand
from quantity rationed individuals. To solve this problem, some studies have resorted to the
econometrics of unobserved regime switching (Bell et al., 1997). Others have employed ancillary
sample information to distinguish individuals with positive demand from those without. For
example, Kochar (1997) uses loan application as a signal of positive loan demand. While the
￿rst approach is subject to statistical limitations, use of loan application as a necessary signal of
positive demand is highly problematic in the presence of quantity rationing, as Mushinski (1999)
argues.4
In an eﬀort to obtain more reliable indicators of positive loan demand, several recent enterprise
surveys have added questions inquiring why ￿rms do not apply for loans. Not only do such
questions reveal signi￿cant numbers of discouraged ￿rms that do not apply for loans because
they know they will not get them (what Mushinski calls preemptively-rationed), they also reveal
4 If loan application is costly and individuals know that quantity rationing is a possibility, they will only apply
for loans for which they have expect to have a reasonable probabilty of success.
2Table 1: Risk and Quantity Rationed Firms
Peru Guatemala
Non-Price Rationed Price Rationed Non-Price Rationed Price Rationed
Quantity Risk Quantity Risk
% 36.7 17.2 46.1 31.1 13.7 55.2
Wealth ($) 13,336 9,396 23,771 21,510 6,024 38,972
Input ($/ha) 451 454 868 NA NA NA
Income ($/ha) 653 593 919 NA NA NA
signi￿cant numbers of non-applicant ￿rms that were discouraged from applying for loans by fear
of losing required collateral in the event of default. The modeling reported in this paper is an
eﬀort to make theoretical sense of this empirical report of fear-driven non-borrowers.
Table 1 reports data on risk-rationing from two recent surveys, one of agricultural enterprises in
Peru (Boucher, 2000) and the other of rural farm and non-farm enterprises in Guatemala (Barham
et al., 1996). Firms reported as price rationed in the table include both ￿rms that borrowed and
those that chose not to because they did not need capital or found the interest rate to be too high.
Non-price rationed ￿rms are those that indicated that they would have liked to have borrowed
money at the going rate of interest, but that they either could not qualify for a loan (i.e.,w e r e
quantity rationed), or were afraid to take one because of the risk of collateral loss (risk rationed).
As can be seen, risk rationed enterprises constitute 14% to 17% of all surveyed enterprises, and
they are 30% of all non-price rationed ￿rms. Failure to account for risk rationed households as
non-price rationed would clearly have a major eﬀect on the analysis of the eﬃciency of credit
markets under asymmetric information.
Table 1 also displays some additional information on risk-rationed versus other types of ￿rms.
Given the relative homogeneity of agricultural producers in the Peru survey, we can glean a
meaningful idea of the activity choice of risk rationed producers by looking at their use of inputs
as well as net-income produced per-unit land. As can be seen, the risk rationed ￿rms appear
similar to the quantity rationed, with both inputs and income some 30% to 50% below that of
price rationed producers. In both the Peru and Guatemala data sets, we see that the mean wealth
3holdings of both risk-rationed and quantity rationed producers are below the sample means. In
the language of this paper, non-price rationing appears wealth-biased in these samples.
We turn now to develop a theory of risk rationing in moral hazard-constrained credit markets.
The next section lays out a model of entrepreneurial behavior under uncertainty and describes the
structure of credit contracts. Section 3 explores the implications of asymmetric information on
the existence and terms of the optimal credit contract, and demonstrates the potential for wealth-
biased quantity and risk rationing. Section 4 concludes the paper with a numerical simulation of
the model that shows how wealth-biased risk and quantity rationing conspire to create a world in
which initial inequality and class structure reproduce themselves over time.
2 Key Assumptions and Model Structure
Every agent has an initial endowment of wealth, W ∈ (W,W), as well as an endowment of a
productive asset which we will call labor. Each agent￿s labor endowment is identical, and the
agent must decide whether to allocate his or her labor to an entrepreneurial activity or to ￿rent￿
it out for wages. Wage labor jobs pay a certain income of ω and require a high level of eﬀort.
Gross entrepreneurial income, X, is generated according to the following stochastic process:
X = x(k,j(e)) =

      
      
xs if j = sa n dk≥ K
xf if j = fa n dk≥ K
0 if k < K
(1)
where k is capital input sunk into the entrepreneurial project, e is the agent￿s level of eﬀort, and
j is the state of nature realized after capital and eﬀort are committed. There are two states of
nature: success (j = s) and failure (j = f). Income under success is greater than under failure:
xs >x f. The agent in￿uences the probability of success through choice of eﬀort￿which can be
either high (e = H)o rl o w( e = L). Let φ
e be the probability of success under eﬀort level e. The
probability of success is increasing in eﬀort so that φ
H > φ
L. The entrepreneurial project has a
￿xed capital requirement K. If the capital requirement is not met, output is zero independent of
4the realized state of nature. Additional capital beyond K has zero marginal productivity. Under
the ￿xed capital requirement, agents with insuﬃcient wealth endowments (W<K ) are unable to
self-￿nance production.5
2.1 Autarchic Self-Finance
Agents have access to a riskless savings activity, and wealth not invested in the productive activity
yields a gross return of (1 + ra). Net entrepreneurial income under autarchic self-￿nance would
thus be:
ya
j = x(k,j) − (1+ ra)k (2)
Note that liability is unlimited under self-￿nance: The entrepreneur pays for the full cost of the
project irrespective of whether the project fails or succeeds. Letting ya
H = φ
Hxs +( 1− φ
H)xf −
(1+ra)k denote expected entrepreneurial income under high eﬀort and ya
L denote the same thing
under low eﬀort, we make the following assumptions:
ya
H > ω > 0 > ya
L (3)
ya
s > 0 >y a
f (4)
Expression (3) indicates that expected net income exceeds the wage rate if high eﬀort is applied
but is negative under low eﬀort. By making realized net income negative under failure, expression
(4) makes liability a non-trivial issue.
Using these assumptions we can graphically portray these payoﬀs in state contingent income
space as shown in Figure 1. Payoﬀs under success are measured along the x-axis, while payoﬀs
under failure are shown on the y-axis. Point L along the 45-degree line denotes the certain
payoﬀ received under wage labor. More generally, any payoﬀ point along the 45-degree, or full
insurance, line yields consumption which is independent of the state of nature. The net income
5 The assumption of a ￿xed project size is made for analytical simplicity. The general conclusions are not
altered under the less restrictive assumption of a diminishing returns, variable input technology. This continuous
input size case is disucssed in chapter four of (Boucher, 2000).
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f), shown as point A in the ￿gure, represents the outcome under autarchic self-￿nance
of the entrepreneurial project. Note that we can de￿ne a locus of state-contingent payoﬀst h a t
would yield an expected value identical to the entrepreneurial project under high eﬀort. This
locus is given by all state-contingent income pairs, (ys,y f), such that φ











ys. The downward sloping line that passes through point A in Figure
1 illustrates this locus. Note that if ya
H = ω, this locus would pass through point L. However,
expression (3) implies that the locus lies to the northeast of point L intersecting the 45 degree
line at a point like A0.
2.2 Credit Contracts
The capital costs of the entrepreneurial project can also be potentially funded by loans. We
assume that competitive lenders must expect a rate of return of rb on loans in order to cover the
6competitive cost of capital. We further assume that rb >r a with the diﬀerence between the two
rates re￿ecting the cost of intermediation.
One possible loan contract that meets the competitive expected rate of return requirement is
the unlimited liability (or fully collateralized) contract that oﬀers the borrower a payoﬀ of the
form:
yb
j = x(k,j) − (1 + rb)k. (5)
Irrespective of the realized state of the world, this unlimited liability contract guarantees the lender
a gross return of k(1 + rb) and expected economic pro￿ts (π) of zero. With rb >r a, the payoﬀs
to the borrower under this contract will appear in Figure 1 at a point like C that is strictly to the
southwest of the self-￿nance payoﬀ pair denoted as point A. Following the notational convention
established above, let yb
H = φ
Hxs +( 1− φ
H)xf − (1 + rb)k denote expected net entrepreneurial
income conditional on high eﬀort and opportunity cost of capital equal to rb. To keep the problem
meaningful, we will further assume that:
yb
H > ω > 0 > yb
L. (6)
Expression (6) implies that, conditional on high eﬀort, the project yields a return greater than
the wage rate even at the higher capital cost, rb. The negative return under failure implied by
expression (4) implies that the unlimited liability loan contract requires a transfer of collateral
wealth to the lender under failure. A wealth level equal to this liability is obviously necessary for
such a contract to be ￿nancially feasible for a borrower.
In addition to the unlimited liability loan contract, there is a large menu of loan contracts that
(conditional on high eﬀort) will yield expected borrower and lender income identical to that given
by the contract represented at point C. While it is conventional to express a loan contract in
terms of the nominal interest rate and collateral requirement, a contract can also be expressed in
terms of the state-contingent payoﬀst h e yo ﬀer to the borrower. As with autarchic self-￿nance,
we can de￿ne the locus of state contingent payoﬀ pairs, (ss,s f), that conditional on high eﬀort














Expected gross lender income is k(1+rb) for every payoﬀ pair along this locus, implying expected
economic pro￿ts of zero for the lender. This conditional zero lender pro￿t locus (denoted π(sj|H))
is illustrated in Figure 1 as the dashed, downward sloping line. Contracts must be on or to the
southwest of the zero pro￿t locus for the lender to at least break even. This locus has the same
slope and is parallel to the entrepreneur￿s iso-income line under self-￿nance.
Note that points along that locus that lie to the northwest of the unlimited liability loan
contract C represent higher nominal interest rates (i.e., lower payoﬀ to the borrower under success)
and lower liability or collateral (i.e., ah i g h e rp a y o ﬀ to the borrower under failure). As such,
northwest movements increase the insurance component of the credit transaction as borrower
income is smoothed across states of nature while expected income is held constant. The payoﬀ
pair denoted C0 is a standard debt contract with full default under failure as sf at that point is
zero. Contracts corresponding to points to the northwest of C0 are rarely observed as the positive
value of sf indicates that the lender makes a further payment to the borrower in the event of
project failure.6 Finally, note that the payoﬀ pair at C00 is the full-insurance loan contract in
which the borrower￿s income is independent of project success or failure (sf = ss).
2.3 Agent Preferences
An agent￿s well being depends on both the level of consumption and the work eﬀort exerted. The
utility for an agent with wealth W is u(cj)−D(e;W), where cj is consumption in state j and u is
a strictly increasing, concave function. We assume that all agents have access to a consumption
minimum yielding ￿nite utility which is exogenously guaranteed to the agent by social or other
mechanisms.7 For convenience we set this consumption minimum to zero and normalize utility
6 Udry (1994), however, gives an empirical example of the existence of such conracts in West Africa.
7 The consumption minimum prevents the lender from oﬀering contracts which drive the agent￿s utility under
failure towards negative in￿nity. If the lender could do so, then there would always exist incentive compatible
8so that u(0) = 0. The disutility of eﬀort, D, depends on both the eﬀort level exerted and the
agent￿s wealth level. Let d(W)=D(H;W)−D(L;W) be the disutility diﬀerential of high versus
low eﬀort. We make the following assumptions. First, the disutility of low eﬀort is independent
of wealth and is normalized to zero so that d(W)=D(H;W) > 0. Second, the disutility of high
eﬀort is decreasing in wealth so that d0(W) < 0. This latter assumption is consistent with the
idea that high (physical) work eﬀort is easier to sustain over time for better nourished people as
Dasgupta (1997) indicates.8
Let V (cj,e;W) denote an agent￿s expected utility. Conditional on high eﬀort, the slope of an













Indiﬀerence curves are downward sloping and convex to the origin. The marginal rate of substi-
tution (MRS) between income under success and income under failure is decreasing, re￿ecting the
desire of risk averse agents to smooth consumption across states. Note that when consumption
is the same in the two states of the world (as it would be under full insurance or wage labor), the
MRS is equal to −φ
H/(1 − φ
H). Finally, because a high initial wealth level would insulate the
agent￿s utility from the success or failure of the entrepreneurial project, we assume that wealth
levels are always low enough that the agent prefers high eﬀort to low eﬀort under the unlimited
liability conditions of autarchic self-￿nance.9
Figure 1 above displays these indiﬀerence curves for two expected utility levels: V1 that passes
through the full insurance credit contract C00; and, V0 that passes through the certain wage income
contracts and quantity rationing would never occur.
8 Without this assumption, high wealth people, for whom the marginal utility of consumption is low, will have
little incentive to supply high eﬀort levels. As discussed in proposition 2 below, were this the case, collateral
requirements for the optimal contract would increase faster than wealth itself, and high wealth agents would be
quantity rationed in asymmetric information-constrained loan markets.
9 De￿ne ∆ ≡ φH − φL and B(W) ≡ [u(W + ya
s) − (W + ya
f)]∆. B(W) is the expected gain in utility
that comes from choosing high instead of low eﬀort. The agent will choose high eﬀort under autarky if that
gain exceeds the disutility of the higer eﬀort, B(W) >d (W).A s u ﬃcient condition which ensures that agents
with wealth W ∈ (W,W) choose high eﬀort is that the following three conditions hold: 1. B(W) >d (W);2 .
B0(W) ≤ d0(W) ∀W;a n d3 .W<c W where c W : B(c W)=d(c W).T h e ￿rst two conditions are essentially a single
crossing property for the curves B(W) and d(W), while the third condition restricts the wealth levels considered
to those to the left of the crossing point (if it exists).
9option, L. To illustrate how risk rationing could occur, the indiﬀerence curves in this ￿gure
have been drawn with a relatively high degree of curvature. An agent whose preferences were
represented by these bowed indiﬀerence curves would clearly prefer the entrepreneurial activity
under the full insurance credit contract (with payoﬀsg i v e na tC00) to the wage labor contract.
However, the agent would prefer the risk free wage labor activity to the entrepreneurial activity
￿nanced with the unlimited liability credit contract at point C, despite the higher returns of the
latter activity. Such an individual would be risk rationed if the only available credit contract
were the unlimited liability contract.
For subsequent analysis, it is useful to de￿ne the full insurance risk premium, p(yj;W), asso-
ciated with the risky prospect, yj, for a borrower of collateral wealth, W. Following Pratt (1964),
the risk premium is implicitly de￿ned by:
EU(W + yj)=U[W + Eyj − p(yj;W)]. (9)
The risk premium tells us how much certain consumption the agent is willing to give up to
completely eliminate the risk associated with a given income prospect.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the risk premium. V a(W0) and V a(W1) are the
indiﬀerence curves through the self-￿nance option at point A for agents with two diﬀerent wealth
levels. As drawn, the agent with W0 is indiﬀerent between self-￿nance and risk free debt-￿nance
under the full insurance credit contract. As such, p(ya
j;W0)=ya
H − yb
H, and for this agent the
risk premium associated with self-￿nance just equals the ￿nance cost of the full insurance contract
(rb −ra)K. In Figure 2, this risk premium is given by the horizontal distance between points C00
and A0.
The agent with wealth W1, in contrast, strictly prefers self-￿nance. Equivalently, this agent￿s
risk premium is smaller - represented by the fact that V a(W1) crosses the full insurance line to
the northeast of C00. If agents￿ preferences are described by decreasing absolute risk aversion, then
it would follow that W0 <W 1.



































3 Price and Non-Price Rationing in Credit Markets
The nature of credit rationing, credit access and activity choice will depend on the set of contracts
over state-contingent income space that are oﬀered to agents. This section analyzes the set
of contracts that lenders will make available under two informational scenarios. Under the
benchmark case of symmetric information, the agent￿s choice of eﬀort is costlessly observable to
lenders and is contractible, meaning that loan contracts that specify (high) eﬀort are enforceable.
Under asymmetric information, the agent￿s choice of eﬀort is a hidden action and contracts cannot
meaningfully specify it. Under the assumptions made in Section 2, expected project returns
conditional on low eﬀort are negative. The only way a lender could expect to recover costs if
low eﬀort were chosen by the borrower would be if the contract oﬀered the borrower negative
expected income. Clearly such contracts would be of no interest to borrowers, so under symmetric
information, lenders will only oﬀer contracts that specify high eﬀort.
11Under asymmetric information, the lender cannot directly specify the agent￿s eﬀort level and
therefore must consider how contractual payoﬀs indirectly aﬀect the agent￿s choice of eﬀort. The
lender will only oﬀer contracts that are incentive compatible in the sense that their payoﬀ structure
makes it optimal for the agent to choose high instead of low eﬀort.
3.1 Credit Markets under Symmetric Information
Under symmetric information a loan contract is a triplet, (ss,s f,e), that speci￿es state contingent
borrower payoﬀsa n da ne ﬀort level. Lenders will only oﬀer contracts specifying the high eﬀort.
In a competitive loan market the optimal contract, (s∗
s,s ∗
f,H), maximizes the agent￿s expected
utility while guaranteeing the lender non-negative expected pro￿ts. The payoﬀso ft h eo p t i m a l
contract solve the following program:
Max
ss,sf
Eu(W + sj|e = H) (10a)
subject to : π(sj|e = H) ≥ 0 (10b)
−sj ≤ W; j = s,f (10c)
Constraints (10b) and (10c) are respectively the lender￿s zero pro￿t or participation constraint
and the agent￿s wealth or liability constraint. Note that the agent￿s payoﬀ is not restricted to be
non-negative. A negative payoﬀ requires the borrower to hand over some of his assets and thus is
equivalent to a collateral requirement.










The above expression states that, for a given expected income level, the optimal contract equates
the agent￿s MRS of state contingent consumption with the ratio of the success to the failure




u0(cf),t h eo n l y
solution to Equation (11) for a risk averse borrower is a contract that equalizes consumption
12across states￿i.e., sf = ss. The optimal contract is thus at the intersection of the forty-￿ve
degree full insurance line and the lender￿s zero pro￿t contour. In Figure 2, the optimal contract
is at a point C00 with payoﬀso f(yb
H,yb
H).
We now turn to the agent￿s choice among the three activities: debt-￿nance with the optimal
contract, self-￿nance, and wage labor. Since the optimal contract provides full insurance, the
MRS at this contract is independent of agent wealth. As such, the optimal contract itself is
independent of agent wealth. Since the optimal contract is identical for all agents and yields a
certain income of yb
H > ω,d e b t - ￿nance will always be strictly preferred to the wage activity.
Next consider whether agents prefer to ￿nance the risky project with their own funds or with a
credit contract. By choosing self-￿nance, producers avoid the ￿nance cost of the credit contract ￿
equal to (rb −ra)K ￿ and thus earn a higher expected income than under debt-￿nance. However,
self-￿nance implies greater risk. As depicted in Figure 2, let W0 denote the wealth level such
that an agent is indiﬀerent between self-￿nance and debt-￿nance under the optimal, full insurance
loan contract, i.e., p(ya
j;W0)=ya
H − yb
H.10 With this de￿nition, the following proposition is
straightforward to establish.
Proposition 1 Under symmetric information, all agents undertake the high return, entrepre-
neurial project. If risk preferences are described by DARA (IARA), agents with wealth W ≤ W0
will debt (self) ￿nance the risky project while those with wealth W>W 0 will prefer to self (debt)
￿nance.
Two ￿nal points are worth noting under symmetric information. First, if we assume that
K <W 0, then, under DARA, there will exist a class of agents with wealth W : K <W<W 0 who




H, so that their willingness to pay to eliminate the risk of self-￿nance is greater than the
￿nance cost of the credit contract. For these ￿insurance seekers￿, the credit market provides a
substitute (albeit imperfect) for the missing insurance market. Second, even with a perfect credit
market, the absence of an insurance market implies a welfare loss. If actuarially fair insurance
10 Note that risk premium associated with the full insurance loan contract, p(yb
H;W0), is zero.
13were available, then all agents with wealth greater than K would purchase insurance, self-￿nance
the project and earn the state independent income, yb
H, represented by point A0 in Figure 2.
3.2 Credit Markets under Asymmetric Information
The agent￿s eﬀort levels are non-contractible when information is asymmetric. Because loans can
only be pro￿tably made when borrowers choose high eﬀort, lenders will only be willing to oﬀer
contracts that are incentive compatible in the sense that they yield the borrower higher expected
utility under high than low eﬀort. The diﬀerence in expected utility from choosing high versus
low eﬀort is:
η(ss,s f,W)=[ u(W + ss) − u(W + sf)]∆ − d(W), (12)
where ∆ = φ
H − φ
L. An incentive compatible contract is an (ss,s f) pair such that
η(ss,s f,W) ≥ 0. (13)
Expression (13) will be called the incentive compatibility constraint. Under asymmetric informa-
tion, the optimal contract will be de￿ned by the optimization program given in Equations 10a -
10c with addition of the incentive compatibility constraint.
Denote the locus de￿ned by η(sj,W)=0as the incentive compatibility boundary (ICB).T h i s
locus gives the set of contracts such that the incentive compatibility constraint just binds. Total






Equation 14 shows that the ICB is upward sloping with a slope less than unity, as shown in Figure
3. Concavity of the utility function implies that a $1 increase in the success payoﬀ requires a
less than proportionate increase in the failure payoﬀ in order to maintain a constant return to the
agent￿s high eﬀort. Points on or to the southeast of the ICB are incentive compatible; those to
the northwest are not.
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Assuming for the moment that the wealth constraint does not bind, the positive slope of the
ICB, combined with convexity of indiﬀerence curves, implies that the optimal contract is unique
and occurs at the intersection of the lender￿s zero-pro￿t contour and the ICB. The positive slope
of the ICB also implies that the information-constrained, optimal contract will be the incentive
compatible contract that requires the least collateral (i.e., has the highest failure payoﬀ and
provides the greatest amount of insurance).
The curve labelled η(sj,W 1)=0in Figure 3 shows the ICB for an agent with wealth level W1.
The constrained optimal contract for this agent occurs at point C0. While contracts between C0and
C00 yield higher expected utility, the lender will not make them available because they are not
incentive compatible. Asymmetric information has censored the menu of available contracts. For
a given wealth level, an increase in the severity of the incentive problem implies that an agent must
assume greater liability (risk) in a credit contract.11 In Figure 3, a worsening incentive problem
11 The severity of the incentive problem is given by the size of d(W)/∆. Thus the incentive problem is increasing
15would be re￿ected in a downward shift of the ICB, further reducing the menu of loan contracts
and moving the constrained optimal contract farther away from the full insurance contract, C0
and towards the full lability contract at C.
3.3 Non-Price Rationing under Asymmetric Information
The censoring of the menu of available loan contracts under asymmetric information creates the
potential for both quantity rationing and risk rationing. This section will show that both of these
forms of non-price rationing can exist and that they can be wealth-biased in the sense that they
will drive lower wealth individuals into the low return, wage labor activity.
As u ﬃcient condition for a positive credit supply is that there is at least one contract that
is both incentive compatible and yields non-negative lender pro￿ts when the agent pledges their
entire wealth as colletaral. If, instead, there are no full collateral contracts that satisfy both
of these constraints, then the feasible contract set will be empty and the agent will be quantity
rationed. Proposition 2 states the conditions under which quantity rationing will occur and be
wealth-biased.
Proposition 2 (Wealth-Biased Quantity Rationing) Recalling that all agents have a wealth

















there there will exist a unique W∗ ∈ (W,W) such that agents with collateral wealth less than W∗
will have an empty feasible contract set and will be quantity rationed. Agents with wealth greater
than or equal to W∗ will have a non-empty feasible contract set.
Appendix A formally proves this proposition. The intuition behind the proposition is straight-
forward. If the added disutility of providing high eﬀort is small enough for low wealth agents,
then the low collateral contracts that are ￿nancially feasible for these agents will be incentive
compatible and low wealth agents will not be quantity rationed. If, however, the added disutility
in the agent￿s private bene￿to fl o we ﬀort and decreasing in the probability diﬀerential of success under high versus
low eﬀort.
16of high eﬀort exceeds the expression shown on the right hand side of inequality (15), then the
minimum collateral requirement for an incentive compatible contracts exceeds the wealth levels of
the poorest agents, and these agents will then be quantity rationed.
In addition, if the added disutility of high eﬀort for high wealth agents is too high (greater
than the right hand side of inequality (16)), then high wealth agents will be unable to provide the
collateral needed for incentive compatible contracts and they too will be quantity rationed. If,
however, inequality (16) holds, then there will be at least some higher wealth agents for whom
incentive compatible contracts are ￿nancially feasible. If both inequalities hold, then there will
be wealth-biased quantity rationing in the credit market under asymmetric information.
The asymmetric information induced truncation of the available menu of contracts that results
in quantity rationing can also result in another form of non-price rationing that we have labelled
as risk rationing, meaning that: (1) The agent would be oﬀered and demand a credit contract in
the symmetric information world; (2) The agent is oﬀered a ￿nancially feasiable contract in the
asymmetric information world; and, (3) The agent chooses not to accept the oﬀered contract in
the asymmetric information world, preferring the safe, wage labor activity.12 Graphically, risk
rationing is easy to portray. In Figure 3, the agent with wealth level W1 would be risk rationed
since the indiﬀerence curve passing through the optimal contract for wealth level W1 crosses the
full insurance line at point D to the southwest of point L (the certain payoﬀ associated with the
wage labor activity). Here we analyze the circumstances under which wealth-biased risk rationing
occurs.
As a ￿rst step in this analysis, de￿ne the critical wealth level W∗∗ as follows:
W∗∗ : p(yb
j;W∗∗)=yb
H − ω, (17)
where p(yb
j;W∗∗) is the risk premium associated with the constrained optimal contract. An agent
12 There is another group - that we might label ￿insurance rationed￿ - whose credit outcome is altered relative to
the benchmark case. These agents are a subset of the ￿insurance seekers￿ who have suﬃcient wealth to self-￿nance
the risky activity but prefer the full insurance contract. The reduction in the implicit insurance of the second best
contract leads them to self-￿nance the risky activity under asymmetric information.
17with wealth W∗∗ is by de￿nition indiﬀerent between the safe wage activity and bank ￿nance of
the risky entrepreneurial activity. We will say that wealth biased risk rationing occurs if agents
with wealth W such that W∗ <W<W ∗∗ prefer the low return wage activity over available
debt ￿nance (where W∗ was de￿ned in proposition 2 as the lowest wealth level where an incentive
compatible contract is ￿nancially feasible).
More formally, wealth biased risk rationing will occur if (i) W∗∗ ∈ [W∗,W] and; (ii) dpb(W)/dW <
0. This ￿rst condition simply says that the agent who is indiﬀerent between the optimal contract
and wage labor occurs within the relevant range of the wealth continuum. The second condi-
tion (that the risk premium associated with the optimal contract be monotonically decreasing in
wealth) insures that agents with wealth levels below W∗∗ will strictly prefer the safe wage activity,
while those with wealth greater than W∗∗ will strictly prefer debt ￿nance of the entrepreneur-
ial activity. Proof of the existence of wealth biased risk rationing is made complicated by the
fact that changes in wealth aﬀect the optimal activity choice directly via risk preferences, and
indirectly via shifts in the terms of the optimal contract (graphically, an increase in wealth will
reshape both the ICB and the indiﬀerence curves). The following proposition establishes when
conditions (i) and (ii) above hold and thus when wealth biased risk rationing will exist.
Proposition 3 (Wealth-Biased Risk Rationing) Under asymmetric information and agent


















where h() = u−1 . The risk premium associated with the optimal contract will be monotonically
decreasing in wealth (dp(yb











ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
(19)
where σ2
s is the variance of the optimal contract payoﬀsa n dR is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk
aversion evaluated at the riskless consumption level W +yb
H.A s u ﬃcient condition for inequality







j denotes the marginal utility of consumption in state j resulting from the optimal contract.
If the inequalities in both (18) and (20) hold, then wealth biased risk rationing will exist.
18As shown in Appendix B, Equation 18 is a suﬃcient condition for the existence of W∗∗.T h i s
condition places lower and upper bounds on the certainty equivalents of the optimal contracts for
the agents with wealth W∗ and W respectively. Given the existence of W∗∗, inequalities (19) and
(20) are necessary and suﬃcient conditions, respectively, for the risk premium to be decreasing
in wealth (see Appendix B). Agents￿ risk premia depend upon their degree of risk aversion and
the risk implied by their credit contract. Both of these components are functions of agent wealth.
Under DARA, wealthier agents are less willing to insure against a given contract. If contract
terms were independent of wealth, only agents with wealth greater than W∗∗ would accept the
risk of debt-￿nance.
The terms of the optimal contract are not, however, independent of agent wealth. As shown in
Appendix B, the collateral requirement￿and the riskiness of the optimal contract￿will increase
if ∆(u0
s − u0
f) <d 0(W). On one hand, the utility diﬀerential under success versus failure is
diminishing in wealth so that wealthier agents have less incentive to choose high eﬀort. To counter
this incentive eﬀect and ensure that high eﬀort is chosen, lenders would need to increase the
diﬀerence between success and failure payoﬀs and thereby increase the contractual risk facing
wealthier agents. The need for lenders to increase contractual risk is, at least partially, mitigated
by the declining disutility of high eﬀort for wealthier agents. The net result of the incentive versus
the disutility eﬀects of wealth is ambiguous and will depend on the nature of d(.). If the incentive
eﬀect dominates, lenders will raise the collateral requirement for wealthier agents. In contrast,
if the decreasing disutility of eﬀort eﬀect dominates, then wealthier agents will be oﬀered lower
collateral, lower risk contracts. A dominant eﬀort disutility eﬀect is a suﬃcient condition for
wealth biased risk rationing (inequality 20). The necessary condition stated in inequality (19) is
that contractual risk must not increase ￿too much￿ with agent wealth. More precisely, wealth
biased risk rationing occurs if the percentage change in the variance in contract payoﬀsi sl e s s
than the absolute value of the percentage decrease in risk aversion resulting from a unit increase
in agent wealth.
194 The Economics of Risk Rationing: Wealth, Optimal Con-
tracts and Activity Choice
The theoretical model developed in this paper has shown that by shrinking the available menu
of loan contracts, asymmetric information can result in two sorts of wealth-biased, non-price
rationing in credit markets. The ￿rst is conventional quantity rationing in which a subset of
low-wealth agents ￿nd that there is no contract that is made available to them because they lack
the minimum collateral necessary to secure a loan. The second is what this paper has labelled
risk rationing. Risk rationed agents are able to borrow, but only under relatively high collateral
contracts that oﬀer them lower expected well-being than does a safe, wage labor activity. This
latter eﬀect is particularly relevant in developing countries where insurance markets are scarce
and risk averse agents may seek credit contracts both to overcome liquidity constraints and to
obtain insurance against production or price shocks. But when faced with the oﬀer of only a high
collateral contract that places their asset base at risk, risk rationed agents choose a safer, lower
return activity than they would choose in a symmetric information world. Like quantity rationed
agents, the risk rationed are a class for whom decentralized credit markets do not perform well.
From a theoretical perspective, this paper￿s analysis of optimal credit contracts under risk
aversion and asymmetric information suggests several extensions. First, the model could be
extended to incorporate the various means by which borrowers and lenders overcome information
asymmetries. For example, under monitored lending, the agent￿s eﬀort level is monitored￿either
by the lender or by other agents in a group lending scheme￿and a penalty is imposed if the agent
deviates from the agreed upon eﬀort level.13 Extending the model in this direction could help
explain the frequently observed coexistence of multiple institutional forms of credit delivery. A
second and related theoretical extension would be to reconsider the role and logic of informal or
13 Conning (1996, 1999), for example, has taken initial strides along this line by developing a model which
endogenizes the level of monitoring and institutional form under moral hazard for individual credit contracts.
Besley and Coate (1995) and Armendariz de Aghion (1999) develop models of endogenous monitoring under group
lending.
20local lenders who are less subject to information asymmetries. These lenders may be able to oﬀer
contracts with greater implicit insurance than formal sector contracts. This is consistent with
empirical observation that informal lenders rarely require collateral. Even if informal contracts
are more expensive in terms of the expected value of loan repayment, agents may prefer them for
their implicit insurance.14
From an empirical perspective, this paper￿s analysis suggests that studies that fail to take
risk rationed agents into account will overestimate the health of the ￿nancial system. While the
importance of risk rationing, and the health of the ￿nancial system, is ultimately an empirical
question, the potential for risk and quantity rationing to create a world in which low wealth
agents are systematically excluded form high return entrepreneurial activities can be illustrated
by numerically exploring the model developed here. Under the functional forms and parameters
given in Appendix C, Figure 4 displays the mapping between wealth, capital access and activity
choice under decreasing absolute risk aversion. Agents with wealth less than W∗ lack the minimum
collateral required to obtain any loan contract. Agents with wealth between W∗ and W∗∗ have
contracts available to them, but the optimal contract exposes them to excessive risk. The risk
premium associated with the optimal debt contract, p(yb
j;W),e x c e e d st h ed i ﬀerence between
expected income under the entrepreneurial activity and the certain wage activity, yb
H − ω.L i k e
quantity rationed agents, these risk rationed agents undertake the safe, low return wage labor
activity.
Beyond wealth level W∗∗, the risk premuim associated with the optimal contract becomes
less than the diﬀerence between wage and expected entrepreneurial income, and agents accept
loan contracts and undertake the entrepreneurial activity. At wealth level K, agents have enough
private wealth to self-￿nance the entrepreneurial activity, but choose the limited liability of debt
14 Previous research has tended to view the informal credit market in one of two ways. On one hand, the informal
sector is portrayed as the recipient of ￿spillover￿ demand from the formal sector ((Bell, 1990), (Bell et al., 1997)).
In this view, farmers that are quantity rationed in the formal sector have no alternative except to turn to informal
lenders for their credit demand. Alternatively, borrowers may prefer the informal sector to the formal sector
because the low transaction costs in the informal sector make it the lowest eﬀective cost credit source ((Kochar,
1997), (Chung, 1995)). The consideration of risk presented here raises another interpretation of the informal sector.
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￿nance. Finally, beyond wealth level, W∗∗∗,a g e n t sc h o o s et os e l f - ￿nance the entrepreneurial
activity as the insurance component of the optimal contract is worth less than the cost that must
be paid for it in terms of higher interest costs (and lower expected income).15
As in Eswaran and Kotwal (1990), initial wealth and activity choice become tightly wedded
in the analysis here. Fully endogenous quantity and risk rationing lead the initially poor to
choose safe wage labor activity. Those with more favorable initial wealth endowments become
entrepreneurs. The expected rate of return on wealth and labor resources will thus be positively
related to wealth (as in Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis, 1998), and in the face of moral hazard-
constrained credit markets, both class structure and income inequality will tend to reproduce
themselves over time.
15 Formally, W∗∗∗ is such that p(ya




22Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 2
The proof consists of two steps. First, we describe W∗ and show that it is the minimum
collateral requirement necessary for a non-empty feasible set. Second, we show that Equations 15








s ,−W) is the full liability contract at which the incentive compatibility con-
straint (ICC) binds. The contract (smax
s ,−W) is the full liability contract which just meets the
lender￿s participation constraint (PC). An agent with wealth W will have a non-empty feasible
set if and only if smin
s (W) ≤ smax
s (W).A s s u m en o t ,i e .t h a tsmin
s (W) >s max
s (W). Any contract
that satis￿es the agent￿s wealth constraint (WC) and the ICC requires ss ≥ smin
s (W) and thus
would violate the PC. Similarly, any contract that satis￿es WC and PC requires ss ≤ smax
s (W)
and thus would violate ICC. Thus, there would be no contracts which simultaneously satisfy all
three constraints.
W∗ is the wealth level such that all three constraints bind, and is de￿ned by: smin
s (W∗)=
smax











φH > 0. The monotonicity of these two derivatives implies that, if W∗
exists, then any agent with collateral wealth W<(>)W∗ will have an empty (non-empty) feasible
contract set.
We now take up the issue of the existence of W∗. From the above argument, it is clear that if
the poorest agent is not quantity rationed, then no agent will be quantity rationed. Similarly, if
the wealthiest agent is quantity rationed, then all agents will be quantity rationed. Thus we need
to see if parameter values exist such that the poorest agent is quantity rationed and the wealthiest
is not. Begin by ￿nding the minimum disutilty of high eﬀo r ts u c ht h a tt h el o w e s tw e a l t ha g e n t
is quantity rationed. This value, which we denote as d
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Next we ￿nd the maximum disutility of high eﬀort such that the wealthiest agent is not quantity
rationed. This value, denoted by d
∗


















If inequalities 15 and 16 from Proposition 2 hold, then the poorest agent is quantity rationed and
the wealthiest is not and, by the above monotonicity argument, W∗ must lie between W and W.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 3
The proof consists of two steps. First, assume that W∗∗ exists and show that Equations 19
and 20 are necessary and suﬃcient, and suﬃcient conditions for risk rationing. Second, show that
Equation 18 is a suﬃcient condition for the existence of W∗∗.
Let pb be the risk premium associated with the constrained optimal contract. It is straight-




























24Wealth biased risk rationing requires dpb/dW < 0 which, by inspection of Equation 27 is equivalent
to Equation 19 in Proposition 3.
Under DARA, the ￿rst term in square brackets in Equation 27 is negative. The second term
may be either positive or negative depending on the relative sizes of the incentive versus the























A binding PC implies ∂σ2
s/∂W = −2(1 − φ
H)∂s∗
f/∂W, so that an increase in the collateral





















Thus, the collateral requirement will decrease if d0
∆ ≤ u0
s − u0
f, or if the disutility of high eﬀort
decreases more than the utility diﬀerential.
We now take up the existence of W∗∗. Assuming that the risk premium is monotonically de-
creasing in wealth (ie. that Equation 19 holds), then W∗∗ will exist if the agent with the minimum
collateral requirement, W∗, prefers the wage activity to their contract while the wealthiest agent
prefers their credit contract to the wage activity. Consider each of these requirements in turn.
The ￿rst requirement is that:
u(W∗ + ω) > φ
Hu(W∗ + s∗







From Proposition 2, W∗ is such that: s∗
s(W∗)=smin








− W. Then we can rewrite Equation 30 as:









∆ . Thus a suﬃcient
condition for Equation 30 to hold is that u(W + ω) >
φHd(W)
∆ , which is equivalent to the ￿rst
25inequality of Equation 18 of Proposition 3. This suﬃcient condition says that the poorest agent
prefers wage labor to the full liability contract on their ICB (of course this contract would not be
available since it does not satisfy PC).
The second requirement is that:
u(W + ω) < φ
Hu(W + s∗
s(W)) + (1 − φ
H)u(W + s∗
s(W)). (32)
For agents with W>W ∗ we know that the contract (smax
s (W),−W) yields lower expected utility
than the optimal contract. Thus a suﬃcient condition for Equation 32 to hold is that the wealthiest
agent prefers this full liability contract on the lender￿s PC to wage labor. Using the de￿nition of
smax
s ,t h i ss u ﬃcient condition reduces to:









which is equivalent to the ￿nal inequality of Equation 18 of Proposition 3.
Appendix C. Functional Form and Parameters
Production and Risk:
Certain Wage income w =2 5
Gross entrepreneurial incomes: ys =1 0 0 ; yf =0
Success Probabilities: φ
H =7 0 % ; φ
L =2 5 %
Capital investment requirement: K =1 5
Interest rates: ra =5 % ; rb =3 0 %
Expected net entrepreneurial income: yb
H =5 0 .5; ya
H =5 4 .25
Utility:







; b =0 .5, d =0 .35; d1 =1 .6; d2 =5 .
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